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NOTES
No Pain No Gain?!
Who Will Make the Greatest Sacrifices in
Curbing Opioid Analgesic
Diversion and Abuse?
BY KENT DURNING*

I.

T

INTRODUCTION

he Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Agency

("SAMHSA") estimates that nine million people currently abuse
prescription drugs in the United States.' Prescription drugs contribute to
twenty-five percent of all United States drug overdose deaths; 2 this trend3
parallels an increase in legal prescription drug use throughout the nation.
The prescription drug abuse problem is particularly acute in
Kentucky. For example, in 2001 Kentucky's rate of hydrocodone4
J.D. expected 2005, University of Kentucky.
Alexandra Marks, Steep Rise in Abuse of Legal Drugs, C-RISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Oct. 1, 2003, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1001/p0ls0lussc.htm. Abuse is defined as use "for non-medical and often recreational purposes." Id.
An estimated one-third of those abusers are children between twelve and seventeen years
old. SAMHSA reported a 163% increase in emergency room visits for injuries related to
prescription drug abuse between 1995 and 2002. Id.
2 Id. Although these statistics are alarming, it is important to note the possibility for
overlap, where the contribution of prescription drugs in a specific death may be uncertain
because of the contemporaneous use of other illicit or non-pharmaceutical substances.
See infra part III.C on the inadequacy of drug reporting systems.
3 See Marks, supra note I (noting the parallel between a four-fold increase in
prescriptions for Ritalin, a stimulant used to treat attention deficit disorder, and its
increase in popularity as a recreational drug among teenagers).
4 Hydrocodone is "one of the most often-diverted pharmaceutical drugs." DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., DRUGS AND DRUG ABUSE, STATE FACTSHEET, KENTUCKY, at
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distribution per 100,000 residents was almost twice the national average;
it!is.
now the second highest in the nation.5 Further, Kentucky's rate is at
least twenty percent higher than that of Tennessee or West Virginia.6 The
ea'stem part of the state is home to the majority of Kentucky's
prescription drug abuse problems; nine of the state's top ten counties in
per'capita hydrocodone use in 2001 are located in this economically
depressed region. Eastern Kentucky also has an exceptionally high
percentage of per capita prescription drug use relative to the rest of the
nation, 8 and several Eastern Kentucky counties are among the nation's
leaders in the9 distribution of opioid analgesics, commonly known as
"painkillers." The repercussions of this trend permeate all aspects of life
for residents of these areas.' 0
Several factors contribute to the alarmingly high levels of
prescription drug use and abuse in Eastern Kentucky. One factor may be
that the Appalachian region is home to very high rates of cancer, 1 and2
pain.
opioid analgesics are widely prescribed to treat severe cancer
Another possible factor is the prevalence of coal mining and logging in
Eastern Kentucky; both industries present dangers that can lead to
injuries for which opioid analgesics are a common
serious debilitating
13
treatment.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/states/kentucky2003p.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2004)
[hereinafter DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET]. Hydrocodone is "the generic name for a
family of drugs including Vicodin, Lorcet, and Lortab." Jerry Adler, In the Grip of a
Deeper Pain,NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 2003, at 48.
5DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4.
6
1d.
7 Gideon Gil, Prescription for Abuse, Five Doctors at Clinic Allegedly Fed
Addictions, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Oct. 20, 2002, at Al.
DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4.
9Id. "Opioid analgesics [narcotics], the most powerful analgesics, are the mainstay
for treatment of severe acute pain and chronic pain ....Opioids are all chemically
related to morphine, a natural substance extracted from poppies, although some opioids
are extracted from other plants and other opioids are produced in a laboratory." MERCK
MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION 450 (Mark H. Beers ed., 2d home ed., 2003)
[hereinafter MERCK MANUAL], available at http://www.merck.com/mrkshared.
10 DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4. Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney
Lori Daniels describes changes in vote-buying practices in Eastern Kentucky in a way
that illustrates the reach of this problem: "What it takes to get the attention of some voters
now isno longer a case of beer or $10 or $15. Now it's a handful of OxyContin." Id.
" Joseph Gerth, UK to Study Cancer in Appalachia, Region's Death Rate is Higher
than Nation's, COURIER-JOURNAL, Aug. 8, 2000, at BI (noting that Kentucky, Tennessee,
Virginia, and West Virginia, all rank above the national average in various forms of
cancer, and that individuals' failure to get cancer screening is likely one reason).
12James A. Inciardi & Jennifer L. Goode, OxyContin and PrescriptionDrug Abuse,
CONSUMERS' RESEARCH MAGAZINE, July 2003, at 17.
" Id.at 19.
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Some also assert that pharmaceutical abuse is not stigmatized in
Eastern Kentucky because prescription drug use is so wides'pread. 4
Another reason for pharmaceutical abuse not unique to Kentucky is "a
misconception among abusers and others that prescription drugs are safer
than illicit narcotics."' 15 Others point to the region's struggling economy
as a likely cause of high levels of painkiller abuse. 16 Additionally,
Eastern Kentucky's proximity to other state borders enables drug-seeking
Kentucky residents to visit doctors and fill prescriptions in multiple
states, thereby
avoiding detection by Kentucky's prescription monitoring
7
systems.'

A.

Law Enforcement Difficulties in CurbingPrescriptionDrug Abuse
Prescription drug abuse is especially difficult to combat because

medications do not become illegal until they are inappropriately
prescribed or distributed.'l Pharmaceutical controlled substances legally
travel through commercial channels in great quantities, and only upon
diversion late in the distribution process do they become law
14DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4 ("Whole families [in the region] have
grown up abusing these drugs and these individuals see nothing wrong with using
them."); see also Vanita Gowda, Not What the Doctor Ordered,GOVERNING, Jan. 2003,
at 34 (describing the Appalachian region of Kentucky as having a history of recreational
drug use involving illegal and legal drugs).
15 Laura Bauer, Overdose Deaths Rise in Jefferson, Police Recruit Pharmacists,
Physicians, to Help Recognize and Prevent Prescription Drug Fraud, COURIERJOURNAL, Oct. 11, 2003, at Al.
16 Gil, supra note 7. In regions suffering from unemployment and low income,
Medicaid fraud "presents an inexpensive mechanism for abusing drugs and oftentimes an
easy rout to a lucrative enterprise. For example, a Medicaid patient may pay only $3 for a
bottle of one hundred 80-milligram OxyContin tablets... [which] can net the patient up
to $8,000 on the illegal market." Inciardi & Goode, supra note 12, at 18.
17Gideon Gil, PrescriptionForAbuse, Prescription-Monitoring
System Has Gaps,
Few NeighboringStates OperateSimilar Programs,COURIER-JOURNAL, Oct. 21, 2002, at
Al. "Most of the seven states bordering Kentucky do not have prescription--drug
monitoring systems so doctor-shoppers can avoid detection by crossing state lines ....
Indiana and Illinois are the only states adjacent to Kentucky that track sales of controlled
substances, but they monitor only the most addictive drugs." Id. See also Gideon Gil, Bill
Adds Drug-Monitoring Funds, US. Rep Hal Rogers' Program Helps States Curb
WidespreadAbuse of PrescriptionMedications, COURIER-JOURNAL, Jan. 12, 2003, at B 1;
See discussion infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the Kentucky All-Schedules
Prescription Electronic Reporting system (KASPER).
18Bauer, supra note 15 (explaining the practical difficulties encountered in trying to
monitor substances that may be used illegally by some, but are necessary as legal
pharmaceuticals for others).
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enforcement concems.' 9 Deceptive patients, dubbed "doctor shoppers, 2°
are the most likely culprits.2' On the other hand, "[d]ishonest doctors are
the least likely source of diversion, accounting for less than two percent
of all pharmaceutical diversion." 22 Pharmacies are also becoming a
source, of diverted pharmaceuticals. 23
Local and federal law enforcement agencies have achieved some
success combating the prescription drug abuse problem in Kentucky.
Doctors with suspicious prescribing practices have faced both
disciplinary penalties 24 and criminal action.25 In Ashland, Kentucky,
authorities shut down one doctor's clinic that generated cash profits
between $4,000 and $5,000 per day by prescribing controlled substances
26
to drug seekers. Along with physician convictions and discipline, eight
hundred OxyContin abusers and traffickers were arrested by Kentucky
law enforcement personnel between January 2001 and November 2002.27
19 Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management
Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 63 (2003). Conceptualizing prescription drug
abuse, as compared to abuse of more traditional illicit drugs, is difficult because of the
need to balance restricted access with availability in drug control policy. Id.
20 Gil, supra note 7. "Doctor shoppers" obtain opioid analgesics by feigning pain
and visiting multiple doctors. Id.
21 Stephen J. Zeigler & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Pain Relief PrescriptionDrugs,
and Prosecution:A Four-State Survey of Chief Prosecutors, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 75,
76 (2003). Other methods some drug abusers and traffickers use to obtain opioid
analgesics include robbery, assault, and even pharmacy robberies and thefts. Incidence of
the latter has increased dramatically in Eastern Kentucky in recent years. DEA
KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4.
22Ziegler & Lovrich, supra note 21, at 76. The next two most common sources of
diverted pharmaceuticals are older doctors with outmoded prescribing practices and
chemically impaired doctors. Id.
23 DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4. See infra Part IV (discussing
pharmacies).
24 See, e.g., Gregory A. Hall, State Board Suspends Doctor's License, His
PrescriptionsforPain Medicine Set off Inquiry, COURIER-JOURNAL, Oct. 31, 2003, at B7.
One notable example involved the emergency suspension of a Louisville, Kentucky
doctor in October 2003. Kentucky's Board of Medical Licensure issued the suspension
after the physician prescribed Methadone to an undercover Metro narcotics agent
complaining ofa stiffback and then later offered a refill despite the officer's report of no
continuing pain. Id.
25 See, e.g., Gideon Gil, Doctor Pleads Guilty in Drug Case, E. Kentucky Physician
Served Addicts, Was Sometimes Paid in Sex, COURIER-JOURNAL, Apr. 29, 2003, at Al.
Seven Eastern Kentucky doctors, five of whom were connected to one clinic in South
Shore, Kentucky, were convicted or pled guilty for illegally prescribing opioid
analgesics. Physicians working in the South Shore Clinic saw as many as eighty patients
day and prescribed narcotics with little or no medical inspection. Id.
each 26
Id.

27 Alan Maimon, Governor: Financial Crisis Hurts Drug Fight, Patton Urges
Agencies to Boost ProgramsDespite Limited Funds, COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 23, 2002,
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Law enforcement's crackdown on unscrupulous doctors and other
players in the prescription drug black market has had significant
ramifications throughout the prescription drug-abusing community. As
drug availability has fallen,28 the street value of OxyContin has
skyrocketed from $1.00 per milligram to as much as $2.50 per
milligram. 29 Even drug treatment facilities are feeling the strain of the

evidenced by extraordinarily long waiting
area's drug abuse problems,
30
periods for admission.
Law enforcement and civil legal remedies play very important roles

in protecting the public from the potential dangers of pharmaceutical
opioid analgesics. The heightened law enforcement mobilization against
prescription drug abuse in Eastern Kentucky appears to be affecting both
illegal users' drug abusing patterns and the doctors' prescribing
practices. 31 Further, manufacturers of opioid analgesics increasingly face
civil suits for harm suffered by individuals because of their contact with
or use of manufactured pharmaceuticals. These methods of addressing
the prescription drug problem are the most visible and address certain

aspects of the overall issue. However, often lost in the debate over how
to curb the problem is the vital need for effective treatment of patients
suffering from chronic pain. The danger exists that effective pain
at Al. "Operation OxyFest 2001" was a coordinated effort involving more than 100
officers from different jurisdictions that resulted in the arrest of 207 illegal OxyContin
users and dealers in Kentucky. Inciardi & Goode, supra note 12, at 20.
28 DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4. There is some information indicating
that drug abusers are switching to heroin and methadone as the availability of OxyContin
decreases and its price increases. The diminishing supply of OxyContin is also thought to
have contributed to a sharp increase in pharmacy robberies-sixty-nine of Kentucky's
1000 pharmacies were robbed for OxyContin between January 1, 2000, and June 30,
2001.29Id.
Id. See also infra Part L.C (discussing OxyContin).
30 Maimon, supra note 27. Kentucky's budget crisis frustrates the efforts to address
the state's prescription drug abuse problem, and drug treatment facilities suffer from the
shortage of resources. In November 2002 there was a minimum six-week wait to get into
a Kentucky treatment program. Id.
31 The DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4, states:
The availability of OxyContin appears to be diminishing in Kentucky, as
evidenced by the recent rise in the street price from $1.00 to approximately
S2.00 per milligram ....Anecdotal information ...suggests that OxyContin
abusers may switch to heroin and/or methadone in response to a diminished
availability of OxyContin in a given region. This trend is beginning to manifest
itself in Kentucky, with regional doctors increasingly prescribing methadone in
lieu of OxyContin for pain management.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 93

treatment will be overlooked or even hindered by policies and legal
doctrines intended to remedy the prescription drug abuse problems.32
This note focuses on the law and policy meant to regulate the
manufacturer and distribution of opioid analgesics and the effect (or
potential effect) on the quality and availability of pain management
medication. Of special concern is the manner in which the needs of pain
patients tend to yield to law enforcement policies, since the most
efficient and frequently employed responses to the problem involve
limiting or complicating access to pain medications.
Section II describes the role played by the FDA and the DEA in
approving and regulating the manufacturer. and distribution of
prescription opioid analgesics and highlights the degree to which law
enforcement policies tend to override medical health policies. 33 Section
III focuses on the role played by state medical and pharmaceutical
licensing bodies in establishing standards for prescribing and dispensing
opioid analgesics, and outlines steps taken by Kentucky to address the
problems of abuse and pain undertreatment. 34 Section IV addresses the
special problem of pharmacies. 35 Section V discusses proposed changes
in the tort doctrines used against the manufacturers of opioid analgesics
and the detrimental effect these proposals could have on patient access to
and progressive developments in pain management technology. 36 The

remainder of this section provides a framework in which to address some
of the problems unique to prescription drug abuse which are necessary to
a full understanding of this sensitive issue.37
B. OxyContin

OxyContin is an appropriate illustration for much of the law and
policy discussed herein because it is both condemned as too prone to
abuse and applauded as a breakthrough in pain management. Purdue
Pharma, OxyContin's manufacturer, has been criticized for aggressively
marketing such an addictive substance and for recommending its use to
treat lower levels of pain.38 At the same time, Purdue Pharma defends
32 See infra Part III.A. 1-2.

33See infra notes 61-97 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 98-173 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 174-196 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 197-252 and accompanying text.
37
See infra notes 38-60 and accompanying text.
38 Gowda, supra note 14, at 35. Jody Collins, Florida's Senior Assistant Attorney

General, asserts that OxyContin's marketing went "above and beyond the marketing of
other drugs." Id.
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itself saying that it has appropriately disseminated information about a
valuable new development in pain management. 39 OxyContin's
development and marketing thus illustrate most of the issues of law and
policy addressed in this note.
1. HistoricalBackgroundof OxyContin

After its release in 1996, OxyContin rapidly became the most widely
prescribed opioid analgesic, recording sales in excess of $1 billion in
2002. 4 1 OxyContin is similar to morphine, but with fewer side effects. 41
The synthetic opioid in OxyContin is oxycodone hydrochloride, the same
one featured in other Schedule II painkillers. 42 However, OxyContin is

unique because its tablets are not accompanied by some form of

nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug ("NSAID"), 43 and it44 is
hours.
manufactured for sustained pain relief over a period of twelve

The specific advantages of OxyContin are difficult to quantify, but
anecdotal evidence coupled with the sheer volume of physician
prescriptions suggests that it satisfies an otherwise unmet need. 45 It
39Id.

Noah, supra note 19, at 62. See also Marks, supra note 1 (noting that prescriptions
for OxyContin have increased twenty-fold between 1996 and 2000); Inciardi & Goode,
supra note 12, at 18 (citing retail sales of more than $1.45 billion in 2001 and $1.59
billion in 2002).
41 Dianne E. Hoffman & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight
40

of Physician Opioid Prescribingfor Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L.

21, 23 (2003).
See Noah, supra note 19, at 61-62.
43 See PURDUE PHARMA L.P., OxYCONTIN

MED. & ETHICS
42

PACKAGE INSERT: CLINICAL PHARMA-

COLOGY (2003), http://www.purduepharma.com/PI/Prescription/Oxycontin.pdf. "Most
nonopioid analgesics are classified as nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs)
... and may be combined with opioids to treat moderate to severe pain." MERCK
MANUAL, supra note 9, at 452.
'ANoah, supra note 19, at 62. The name "OxyContin" was chosen in part to convey
the distinguishing characteristic: "Oxy-" for oxycodone HCl, and "-contin" for
controlled-release. See PURDUE PHARMA L.P., OXYCONTIN PACKAGE INSERT: CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY (2003), http://www.purduepharma.com/PI!Prescription/Oxycontin.pdf.
45 Noah, supra note 19, at 67. Noah explains that while anecdotal evidence "give[s]
no sense for the drug's aggregate utility," the more than six million prescriptions written
each year suggest an increased medical efficacy relative to other opioid narcotics. Id. The
number of prescriptions seems to be a good indicator of efficacy because it is unlikely
that unethical prescribing practices could inflate the number of OxyContin prescriptions
into the millions. Presumably, the majority of these prescriptions are legitimate, and that
number reflects the drug's benefits. Id. See Hoffman & Tarzian, supra note 41, at 25
(noting that increased volume of prescriptions is not always proof of diversion).
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provides an additional pain relief benefit over other oxycodone and
hydrocodone products because these other medications offer uneven
relief for only three to four hours.46 Furthermore, the presence of

NSAIDs in many other opioid painkillers can have significant deleterious
effects that do not occur with OxyContin.47
OxyContin's time-release design provides a benefit when used
according to instructions, enabling a more stable administration of
oxycodone than competing products.4 Considered alone, this feature
would seem to decrease the drug's attractiveness to abusers because it
does not produce the quick, euphoric high that competing opioid
narcotics produce. 49 However, OxyContin's time-release design can be

bypassed by scraping or sucking the coating off, crushing the pill, and
swallowing, snorting, or injecting the pure oxycodone. 50 Bypassing the
time-release feature makes the drug more attractive to abusers than

competing tablets because the entire twelve-hour dosage can be ingested
immediately,
without the undesirable NSAIDs contained in other opioid
51
analgesics.
2. Is OxyContin the Problem?
Overdose deaths from OxyContin are usually the result of acute

pulmonary edema.52 Combining opioids with other depressant drugs, a
common practice among drug abusers, increases the risk of death by
compounding the respiratory depressant effects of opioids.53

46 Noah, supra note 19, at 62.
47 MERCK MANUAL, supra note 9, at 453. "Regular use of NSAIDs may... increase
the risk of developing a kidney disorder, sometimes resulting in renal failure (a disorder
called analgesic nephropathy)." Id. "NSAIDs tend to irritate the stomach's lining and
cause digestive upset . . . , peptic ulcers, and bleeding in the digestive tract." Id. at 452.
"For older people, the risk of side effects due to NSAIDs is increased." Id.
48 Noah, supra note 19, at 62.
49 Id. In fact, "Purdue Pharma and Abbot Labs promoted [OxyContin] to a broader
group of physicians and as presenting a lower risk of abuse and diversion." Id.
0 Id. See also Adler, supra note 4, at 49 (discussing drug abusers' methods).
5 Noah, supra note 19, at 62; Adler, supra note 4, at 49 (noting that the side effects
ofopioid analgesics accompanied by NSAIDs may act as a disincentive to abuse).
52 Noah, supra note 19, at 62.
53 Edward J. Cone et al., Oxycodone Involvement in Drug Abuse Deaths: A DAWNBased ClassificationScheme Applied to an Oxycodone Postmortem DatabaseContaining
over 1000 Cases, 27 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 57, 59 (2003) ("Concomitant coadministration of other depressant drugs ... is common practice among opioid abusers.
This practice substantially increases the likelihood of a fatal outcome because of
potentiation of the respiratory depressant effects of opioids."); see also Part III.C infra
(discussing reporting system inadequacies).
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OxyContin has been held publicly responsible for varying numbers
of deaths in Kentucky since its introduction. Yet, there is some debate
over the actual number of deaths that can fairly be attributed to
OxyContin alone. 4 Some characterize the surge of news attention as a
media frenzy that has unnecessarily vilified a beneficial drug.55
Though OxyContin deaths have received considerable attention, it is
worth noting that the lawful use of nonopioid drugs causes considerably
more deaths than the illegal use of OxyContin.56 For example, NSAIDs
may be a much more serious public health problems, contributing to the
deaths of thousands of patients annually.57 The FDA and the DEA's
preference for NSAIDs over opioid analgesics may be a misplaced
federal policy. One commentator phrases the question as follows:
"[s]hould injuries to third parties who misuse prescription drugs attract
greater concern
from public officials than injuries suffered by legitimate
58
patients?
The issue of effective pain management must also be considered in
light of the recent media attention, which has triggered widespread
concern about the abuse of OxyContin. There is a great risk that
aggressive policies intended to limit the use and abuse of the drug could
be enforced without consideration of their destructive effects on pain
management therapies. Public health policy in general, and physicians in
particular, have become more focused on the needs of suffering patients
as more is learned about the prevalence of untreated pain. Although
positive steps have been taken, measures that are designed to counteract
the abuse of opioid analgesics could interfere with recent advances in
pain management.5 9 One example of that risk was seen in July 2000,
when Purdue Pharma introduced a 160-milligram dosage of OxyContin.
The dosage was designed for patients who had developed opioid
tolerance. However, it was quickly withdrawn from the market after
controversy arose over its abuse. 60

54See infra Part III.C and accompanying text.
55See generally Inciardi & Goode, supra note 12, at 17, 20-21; Sandeep Kaushik,
OxyCon Job: The Media-Made OxyContin Drug Scare, CLEVELAND FREE TIMES, May 28, 2001, at 14, availableat http://www.alternet.org/module/printversion/I 0933.
56 See infra notes 50, 72 and accompanying text.
57Noah, supra note 19, at 71 n.142 (citing a 1998 article estimating 16,500 annual
deaths caused by NSAIDs annually among arthritis patients alone).
5
Id. at 62.
59See generally Inciardi & Goode, supra note 12.
60
Id. at 17.
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FEDERAL REGULATION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

Federal regulation of pharmaceutical controlled substances is not
conducted by a single federal agency; the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") and the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") are both
involved. The FDA is primarily concerned with ensuring that
pharmaceuticals are deemed safe for human consumption, and the DEA
is primarily concerned with enforcing drug laws. Because each agency's
objectives differ, their policies are also divergent in many instances. The
following section presents the contours of each agency's duties regarding
pharmaceutical controlled substances and discusses the results when their
policies collide.
A.

The FDA and the DEA

6
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FFDCA"),
the FDA approves opioid analgesics once they are determined to be safe
and effective for medical use and commercial marketing.62 The FFDCA
establishes no limits to physician prescribing practices; the regulation
of
63
is traditionally within the scope of state power.
practices
such
Accordingly:

Once [an approved] new drug is in a local pharmacy after interstate
shipment, the physician may, as part of the practice of medicine,
lawfully prescribe a different dosage for his patient, or may otherwise
vary the conditions of use from those approved in the package insert,
without informing or obtaining the approval of the Food and Drug
Administration.64

In addition to verifying the safety of pharmaceuticals, the FDA
regulates how they are marketed.6 5 When a drug manufacturer's
6' 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2005).
62 Aaron M. Gilson & David E. Joranson, U.S. Policies Relevant to the Prescribing
of Opioid Analgesics for the Treatment of Pain in Patients with Addictive Disease, 18
CLINICAL J. PAIN, July-Aug. 2002, Supplement, at S91, S92, available at http://www.
medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy/publicat/02cjpn/Tx.addicts.pdf.
63id. at S92 ("Throughout the debate leading to the [passage of the FFDCA], there

were repeated statements that Congress did not intend the Food and Drug Administration
to interfere with medical practice and references to the understanding that the bill did not
purport to regulate the practice of medicine as between the physician and the patient.")
(citing United States v. Evers, 643 F.3d 1043, 1048 n.14 (5th Cir. 1981)).
Evers, 643 F.3d at 1048 n. 14.
65 Noah, supra note 19, at 62-63. However, despite its lack of regulatory authority,
the DEA criticized Purdue Pharma's aggressive marketing of OxyContin. id.
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marketing decisions are in question, the FDA often issues letters
requesting that the responsible company cease its deceptive marketing.
In essence, these letters form a foundation for possible future legal action
against the company.66 The FDA may pursue criminal prosecutions
against firms whose marketing harms public health.67
Opioid analgesics are subject to greater FDA scrutiny than other
drugs because of the rubric under which the FDA approves medications.
The first step in the approval process is demonstrating that the drug has
valid therapeutic value that outweighs any hazardous side effects. 68 A
consequence of this process is that the FDA places a greater emphasis on
the value of medications that target treatable diseases.69 Since opioid
analgesics provide only symptomatic relief, or "palliative care," they
must overcome a greater burden in the approval process.7 ° Further,
palliative care is not only undervalued in the approval process, but opioid
analgesics receive even more scrutiny because of their perceived
hazardous potential."
Opioid analgesics, the most significant medications for pain
management, are classified as "controlled substances" under the
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA").72 The DEA, a division of the
66 Christiane Truelove, An Aggressive Enforcement Strategy, News from Rockville,
MED AD NEWS, Aug. 1, 2003, at 62. The FDA issued a warning letter to Purdue Pharma
requiring them to place a prominent magazine ad to replace previous ads the FDA
regarded as deceptive. Id.
67 See id.

68 See Noah, supra note 19, at 56-57. "[Flirms seeking to market pain management
technologies shoulder a particularly challenging evidentiary burden given the pronounced

placebo effect that researchers encounter in this context." Id. This evidentiary struggle is
compounded by the difficulty in measuring a condition as subjective as pain and by the
variability in patient response to certain treatments. Id.
69 See id.
70 id.
71See id.
72 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2005). The Controlled Substances Act establishes five

schedules of controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2005). These schedules classify
controlled substances according to the following findings:
(1) SCHEDULE 1.
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in treatment

in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under
medical supervision.
(2) SCHEDULE II.
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
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Department of Justice, is responsible for regulating controlled
substances. 73 As a result, substances like opioid analgesics fall under the
regulatory scope of both the FDA and the DEA.74

The CSA imposes a series of registration, security, and monitoring
requirements on all individuals and businesses involved in the legal
distribution of controlled substances. 75 As evidenced by its scheduling

decisions, it appears that Congress recognizes the necessity of
accommodating substances with legitimate medical applications while
still protecting the public from the potential dangers of controlled
substances.76 The CSA also empowers the DEA to impose requirements

on manufacturers and distributors or legal narcotics that vary depending
on the schedule rating of the drug involved."
(B) The drug or other substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to sever psychological or
physical dependence.
(3) SCHEDULE III.
(A) The drug or other substance has a potential for abuse less than the drugs or other
substances in schedules I and II.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to moderate or low physical
dependence or high psychological dependence.
(4) SCHEDULE IV.
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs or
other substances in schedule III.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical dependence or
psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule III.
(5) SCHEDULE V.
(A) The drug or other substance has a low potential for abuse relative to the drugs or
other substances in schedule IV.
(B) The drug or other substance has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States.
(C) Abuse of the drug or other substance may lead to limited physical dependence or
psychological dependence relative to the drugs or other substances in schedule IV.
Id.
73Noah, supra note 19, at 58.

74See
75

Gilson & Joranson, supra note 62, at S92.
Noah, supra note 19, at 58.
76Id. This recognition by congress helps to "explain[] the central role, for purposes
of distinguishing Schedule I from all other controlled substances, of the criterion that asks
whether the drug has 'a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States."' id. (citation omitted).
77 Id. Production quotas, precise inventory systems, registration procedures, and
secure production and transportation facilities are among the requirements imposed upon
manufacturers of Schedule II medications. Id.
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B. The Interactionof FDA and DEA Regulation

The CSA and the FFDCA are independent statutory schemes. As a
result, the CSA has no role in defining the appropriate medical uses of
controlled substances. 78 This does not mean, however, that the FDA's

health concerns always assume primary importance with regard to
decisions about the use of controlled substances. Generally, the FDA

prefers simply to approve substances with some medical applications,
leaving judgments concerning the comparative efficacy of medications to
practitioners and patients. 79 However, Congress may preempt the FDA's
conclusions regarding the accepted medical use of an approved drug due

to law enforcement concerns.8 ° Such instances demonstrate that drug
control policies 81may supersede the goal of promoting and improving
medical science.

As pharmaceuticals that pose a heightened risk of abuse, opioid
analgesics face greater scrutiny throughout the FDA's approval process,
despite posing fewer risks to patients than some non-narcotic
alternatives. Not surprisingly, non-narcotics may be approved with
significantly less scrutiny than their opioid counterparts. For example,

two separate NSAIDs, Zomax and Duract, were approved by the FDA
despite suspected risks to patient health.

The approval of each drug was

78 Gilson & Joranson, supra note 62, at S92 ("The CSA has the clear purpose of
controlling the abuse and diversion of controlled substances, while not interfering with
appropriate prescribing for medical and scientific purposes.").
79 Noah, supra note 19, at 56.
80 Noah, supra note 19, at 59-60. One example of Congress preempting the FDA
involved the approval of methaqualone ("Quaalude") as an accepted medical treatment
for insomnia. Congress required the FDA to withdraw its approval and mandated
rescheduling it as a Schedule I controlled substance. Congress justified the
reclassification with its conclusion that methaqualone did not offer advantages over other
products with less risk of abuse-a law enforcement concern.
81 Another example of the primacy of drug control policies may be seen in the
FDA's approval of Marinol. Marinol contains the synthetic form of tetrahydrocannabinol
("THC"), which is the principal psychoactive ingredient in marijuana. Although the FDA
and DEA both deny the existence of any accepted medical use for marijuana, Marinol
was not only approved as a Schedule II controlled substance, but was subsequently
rescheduled as Schedule III at the insistence of its corporate sponsor. See id. at 60;
Marsha N. Cohen, Breaking the Federal/State Impasse Over Medical Marijuana: A
Proposal,11 HASTINGS WoMEN's L.J. 59, 60-62.
82 The FDA approved the NSAID Zomax, despite knowledge that it was a potential
human carcinogen, because it was considered a non-narcotic alternative for treating
severe pain. Zomax met its commercial demise when patients began dying mysteriously
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at least partially based on the agency's preference 'for non-narcotic pain
treatment alternatives that are not prone to drug abuse.8 3 In both
instances, however, these drugs were subsequently
removed from the
84
market after serious health risks were observed.
C. Patient'sInterests Suffer When Policies Collide

The FDA's preference for certain classes of drugs over others,
dubbed the "one size fits all approach," is criticized for its failure "to
account for the possibility that [the contested] drug might provide some
unique benefit to a small group of patients who are refractory to the drug
of choice. 85 This approach is problematic because the FDA has ignored
the experiences and needs of patients exhibiting abnormal responses to
generally-prescribed, normally effective drugs. It is clear that "[i]f
aggregate risk-benefit balancing [embodying the one size fits all
approach] becomes the standard for future scheduling decisions, then the
needs of individual patients will compete against the consequences of the
irresponsible behavior of abusers, and the DEA may opt to sacrifice
products that offer insufficiently
dramatic advantages over existing
86
alternative treatments.
Great tension exists between drug enforcement policies implemented
to protect society from the destructive effects of drug abuse, and medical
health policies adopted to protect an individual patient's right to the most
effective medical treatment. As one scholar notes:
It makes little sense to protect irresponsible physicians and illegitimate
users from their own bad judgment if it means sacrificing the welfare of
those in genuine need .... (A]gency initiatives that attempt to restrict
from anaphylactic reactions. Similarly, the FDA approved Duract, another NSAID valued
as an alternative to narcotic analgesics, despite reviewers' concerns that it might cause
liver damage. The manufacturer of Duract removed it from the market within a year of its
release after correlations developed between Duract use and liver toxicity, which
"resulted in at least four deaths and eight liver transplants." Noah, supra note 19, at 5657.
83id.
84Id. It is interesting to note that overuse or abuse of antibiotics also poses a great

public health hazard, although they are not considered to be as substantial a public health
risk as opioid analgesics because they are not targets of diversion. A failure to follow
indications when using antibiotics can give rise to drug-resistant bacterial strains,
estimated by some to contribute to 70,000 deaths annually. The media does not publicize

this threat in the same way it does the threat of opioid diversion, though it is potentially
further reaching. Id. at 73 n. 167.
85

16

d. at 59.

Id. at 59-60.
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access by limiting supplies or channels of distribution would reflect an
unfortunate pursuit of administrative expediency or a response to the
failure of more precisely targeted law enforcement efforts.8 7
This policy collusion can produce alarming results. Specifically, the
medications with acknowledged health risks for a few legitimatelyprescribed patients are preferable to lower-risk medications with a
higher potential for criminal abuse. In other words, a higher likelihood of
side effects to an already suffering patient is preferred to a heightened
risk of illegal diversion. 8 "[T]he long-running 'war on drugs"' upsets
the intended balance "between the extent to which control decisions
should be based upon law enforcement criteria, and the extent to which
such decisions 89 should be based on medical and scientific
determinations."
No area of medical treatment is affected by this imbalance as much
as pain management. A different approach is required in this field
because practitioners treat symptoms, not diseases. Further complicating
the "one size fits all approach" is that pain is subjective. and
unquantifiable, and patient reaction to medical treatment is highly
variable. 90 In this context, dividing regulatory authority between a law
enforcement agency and an agency focused on patient health can
generate incongruities:
In some instances, the DEA's desire to facilitate prosecution of drug
abusers by placing a substance into Schedule I or II conflicts with the
FDA's effort to promote the development of a drug potentially valuable
in the treatment of a legitimate class of users .... In other instances....
the FDA has done little more than 'rubber stamp' DEA scheduling
91
recommendations.
A shift in the government's perception of drug abuse occurred during the
Reagan era. Drug abuse was once considered a public health issue, but
came to be perceived as an issue of politics, morals, and law

7
Id. at 63.
88 See supra Part II.C.

89 Noah, supra note 19, at 60.
90 See id. at 59-60.

91Id. at 61. These scheduling incongruities are especially problematic in light of the
necessary studies required for FDA approval once a substance is placed in Schedule I.
Merely obtaining approval to test Schedule I substances is exceedingly difficult. See id.
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enforcement. 92 When applied to the prescription drug abuse problem, this
shift poses several dangers. Eastern Kentucky, where there are many
people with pain management needs, provides a good example: there is a
great risk that Reagan era law enforcement policies aimed at restricting
access to opioid analgesics could undermine patient health policies in
that region and perpetuate the problem of pain undertreatment.93
In 2003, the DEA announced an increase in controlled substance fees
paid by pharmacies-$2 10 every three years, to $393 every three years.94
The DEA said these controlled substance fees "would raise $134 million
for the [Diversion Control Program] in fiscal year 2004, $15 million of
which by law must go to the U.S. treasury., 95 DEA officials said the
primary reason for the increase was to fight OxyContin diversion and
inappropriate Internet opioid analgesic prescriptions.9 6 Some pharmacist
and physician groups see this as simply another exercise of federal power
that prioritizes law enforcement policies above those of public health by
"capitalizing on public concern over OxyContin and other often-abused

[prescription] drugs to expand the diversion program at the expense of
healthcare providers. 9 7
III.

STATE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL CONTROLLED

SUBSTANCE PRESCRIPTION AND DISTRIBUTION

Medical and pharmacy practice is governed by state rather than
federal agencies. Because pharmaceutical controlled substance diversion
and abuse involves physicians and pharmacists, their involvement "along
with the bodies responsible for their oversight, is crucial in addressing
diversion and abuse. The following section discusses the pain
undertreatment problem brought on by the mounting concerns about
pharmaceutical abuse. Undertreatment of pain experiences by patients
occurs when their pain is not properly controlled despite the technology
and resources to do so. It is a very real danger because of a combination
92 Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 41, at 22.

9'See id.
94Todd Zwillich, Feds Propose to Raise Rx Diversion Enforcement Fees, DRUG

Topics, March 17, 2003, at 51.

95id.
96 Id.
97Id. ("[T he diversion control program has led to frosty relations between DEA and

pharmacists."). In fact, general counsel for the National Community Pharmacists
Association has advised pharmacists to opposed forced fees by refusing to cooperate with
DEA agents. Physicians have also expressed some displeasure with the fees. As one
AMA spokesman asserted, "We're opposed to user fees for needs that should be borne by
all of society." Id.
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of factors. Reluctance of physicians to prescribe opioid analgesics out of
fear of running afoul of regulations or of encouraging patient addiction
and refusal of pharmacies to even supply these drugs are two main
reasons discussed in this section. The responses taken by some state
bodies and an analysis of those measures with respect to the pain
undertreatment problem are also discussed.
A.

The Pain UndertreatmentProblem
1. Pain Undertreatment:Physician PrescribingPractices
During the last two decades, the United States medical community

has largely come to accept both the pervasiveness of pain undertreatment
and the minimal risks of addiction for pain patients without a history of

drug abuse. 98 Despite this fact, estimates of the number of Americans
suffering from chronic pain exceed 50 million, and "more than 40% to

50% of patients in routine practice settings fail to receive adequate
relief' for chronic pain. 99 As a result, many physicians and governmental
agencies have become more attentive to the needs of chronic pain
patients. 100
Although there is no single reason for the widespread undertreatment

of pain, one factor is physicians' reluctance to prescribe narcotic pain
medications. Many physicians attribute their reluctance to prescribe
opioid analgesics to concerns about "closer regulatory scrutiny, criminal
investigation, or even criminal prosecution."' 10 Studies also indicate that
98 Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 41, at 21.

99 Tammy Chernin, Painkillers and Pill Popping: Profession Mounts Counteroffensive Against the Growing Problem of Opioid Abuse, DRUG Topics, Aug. 6, 2001, at
3 1. The financial costs resulting from chronic pain are high. It is estimated that the annual
cost of medical expenses, lost income, and lost productivity owing to chronic pain is
$100 billion. Id.
'00 Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 41, at 21. Hoffmann and Tarzian note that many
"physicians began to prescribe greater amounts of pain medication" and that "[m]any
state legislatures also passed 'intractable pain statutes... designed to provide physicians
with some assurances by reducing both the real and perceived risks of being subjected to
regulatory sanctions for treating pain with controlled substances."' (citations omitted).
101 Ziegler & Lovrich, supra note 21, at 75. Physicians treating the terminally ill
have the additional concern "that their actions could be misconstrued as physicianassisted suicide or euthanasia" in the event of patient death "during the course of
aggressive palliative care." Id. at 76. See also Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 41, at 21
(noting physician confusion about acceptable opioid prescribing practices and their scope
of potential liability).
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physicians are slow to prescribe narcotics because they are "concerned
that 'their prescribing practices will raise suspicions of pharmaceutical
diversion," and because "of [a] fear of iatrogenic addiction.' ' 2 However,
evidence suggests that health care professionals often have great
misconceptions regarding the level of regulatory scrutiny to which they
are actually subject. In fact, the degree of perceived regulatory risk
usually far exceeds the actual risk. 103

Another factor contributing to the undertreatment of pain is the
comparative likelihood that state medical boards will discipline for over
prescription rather than under prescription. A survey of state medical
board executives in thirty-six states revealed that a higher threshold of
harm was likely to be applied in evaluating complaints of pain
undertreatment.1°4 This problem appears to be exacerbated by the fact
that most state medical board efforts to educate physicians about pain

management issues tend to focus "on what physicians- who prescribe
opioids for pain must do to avoid board scrutiny."' 0 5 This approach does
not adequately address the problems of pain undertreatment.
Additionally, federal regulatory agencies' heightened attention to
pharmaceutical abuse and diversion contributes to the concerns voiced
by many doctors. State medical boards feel pressure to closely monitor
and discipline physicians because of "concerns about Medicare and
10 6
Medicaid fraud and abuse and the government's 'war on drugs."
Some commentators trace this pressure to state medical boards

102

Ziegler & Lovrich, supra note 21, at 75-76. An addiction is iatrogenic when it is

"induced inadvertently by a physician or surgeon or by medial treatment or diagnostic
procedures." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 572 (10th ed. 2002).
103 Ziegler & Lovrich, supra note 21, at 75-76; see also News Release, Drug
Enforcement Administration, The Myth of the "Chilling Effect" (Oct. 30, 2003), http://
www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/prl03003p.html. The DEA states that the chilling
effect enforcement of the CSA has on physicians is a myth. During the first through third
quarters of 2003, a mere .05% of the 963,385 DEA-registered physicians prescribing
controlled substances actually had legal action taken against them. Similarly, in each year
between 1999-2002, fewer than 1% of physicians were subject to any action by the DEA.
An inquiry into the types of action taken against physicians might also allay any concerns
they may have. For the first through third quarters of 2003, the DEA's diversion
investigations took the following action against doctors: 7.79% had their registrations
revoked; 1.36% suffered civil fines; 4.76% received administrative hearings; 4.99%
received letters of admonition; 7.71% were arrested; and 73.47%, the vast majority, were
"surrenders for cause." Id.
104Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 41, at 38 (noting that state medical boards more
often consider over-prescribing "a clear violation of standard care and a clear example of
patient harm," as compared to under-prescribing).
lOSId. at 38-39.
oId.at 22.
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disciplining physicians for over prescribing opioids. 10 7 In turn, these
disciplinary measures reinforce physicians' fears that their own
prescribing, however appropriate, may make them susceptible to
sanctions. 108
2. Pain Undertreatment:PharmacyRefusal to Fill, Sell, or Stock

Physicians, as the administrators of therapy and treatment, play a key
role in addressing the pain management problem. Pharmacists, as the
primary dispensers of opioid analgesics, also play an integral role.
Addressing the problems of opioid abuse and diversion, while protecting
patients' needs, requires pharmacists to be just as involved as physicians.
Due to the public health dangers created by unsupervised use of
controlled substances and other potentially harmful medications,
pharmacy practice is essentially a "socially sanctioned monopoly."' 10 9
Pharmacists are subject to extensive civil, criminal, and regulatory
monitoring and liability for improper professional conduct." 0 Because of
this heavy responsibility, pharmacists are understandably cautious when
dispensing substances that may present a risk of liability.
Some authors assert that pharmacists have a duty to dispense opioid
analgesics when presented with a legally valid prescription that is
therapeutically appropriate for the patient."' Pharmacists can contribute
to the problem of untreated pain when they refuse to fill such
prescriptions.' 12 It should be noted that a pharmacist's refusal to fill such
valid and appropriate prescriptions is generally unintentional. Many
refusals are caused by the difficulty in determining when prescriptions
satisfy validity and appropriateness requirements." 3
The DEA's Corresponding Responsibility Rule ("DEA Rule")
attempts to distinguish between a prescription and a purported
107
id.
108

id.

109David Brushwood, The Pharmacist'sDuty to Dispense Legally Prescribedand
TherapeuticallyAppropriateOpioidAnalgesics, PHARMACY TIMES, Jan. 2002, at 55-56.
"0 Id.at56.
...Id. at 55-56.
112 Id. "[P]harmacists have at times sought to oversimplify their diversion prevention
activities." Id. Generally, while pharmacists are mindful of the effect that filling invalid
or inappropriate prescriptions can have on substance abuse, they give less thought to the
risk of pain undertreatment caused by refusing a valid and appropriate prescription. Id.at
11"See

id. at 56.
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prescription. 14 Under the DEA Rule, it is "unlawful for a pharmacist to
knowingly fill a purported prescription.""' However, "[a]n innocent
filling of a purported prescription by a pharmacist who could not know
that the order is not legitimate does not violate the regulation."" 6 Under
this rule, if a prescription should have prompted inquiry but the

pharmacist ignores "obvious indicators of invalidity," that pharmacist
has breached a legal requirement.'1 7 The DEA Rule combats substance
abuse by limiting pharmaceutical diversion. However, many pharmacists
lack an understanding of the fine distinctions between addiction,'"

physical dependence, H9 analgesic tolerance,' 20 pseudo-addiction,' 2 1 and

substance abuse. 122 This can lead pharmacists to overscrutinize valid
prescriptions in the shadow of DEA-imposed regulation. The difficulty

is that symptoms and behaviors of substance abuse, which should trigger
higher scrutiny in evaluating the validity and appropriateness of a

prescription, can easily be mistaken for the 23predictable symptoms of a
patient with legitimate pain treatment needs.'

114

Id. "A prescription is an order for medication that has been issued for a legitimate

medical purpose by an authorized prescriber... acting in the usual course of professional
medical practice." In contrast, a purported prescription is an order "issued for other
reasons, such as the support of addictive habits." Id.
"5 Id.
116 Id. at 57. The DEA Rule thus takes into account the inevitability of mistakes and
inadvertent
fillings of purported prescriptions.
171d.
118 Addiction is defined as "a neurobehavioral syndrome with genetic and
environmental influences that results in psychological dependence on the use of
substances for their psychic effects and is characterized by compulsive use despite harm."
Id. at 59. (quoting MODEL GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR
THE TREATMENT OF PAIN (Federation of State Medical Boards 1998)).
119 "Physical dependence on a controlled substance is a physiologic state of
neuroadaptation ... characterized by the emergence of a withdrawal syndrome if drug
use is stopped or decreased abruptly, or if an antagonist is administered. Physical
dependence is an expected result of opioid use. .. [which], by itself, does not equate with
addiction." Id.
120 "Analgesic tolerance is the need to increase the dose of opioid to achieve the
same level of analgesia. Analgesic tolerance may or may not be evident during opioid
treatment and does not equate with addiction." Id.
121Pseudo-addiction is a "[plattem of drug-seeking behavior of pain patients who
are receiving inadequate pain management that can be mistaken for addiction." Id.
122 "Substance abuse is the use of any substance(s) for nontherapeutic purposes; or
use of medication for purposes other than those for which it is prescribed." Id.
123 See id. at 56. For example, a patient who has been taking opioid analgesics to
treat a medical condition may become physically addicted to the medication. Analgesic
tolerance will develop after continued treatment, and increasing dosages of opioid
analgesics will be required to maintain the efficacy of the treatment. The manifestations
of physical dependence and analgesic tolerance in patient conduct, such as requesting
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Another factor contributing to the excessive scrutiny of opioid

analgesic prescriptions by pharmacists is the lack of clear guidance from
case law,124 because "court cases do not always function well in the
establishment of clearly defined standards for the profession." 125 Case
law provides guideposts only for the most egregious deviations from
accepted practice. 26 This lack of clarity about liability, combined with
the mindset engendered by the war on drugs, has led many pharmacists

to err on the side of restricted distribution, which can be a barrier to
proper pain management. 21
A related way that pharmacists can contribute to the undertreatment
of pain is by refusing to carry opioid analgesics due to the recent outbreak of pharmacy robberies. Between January 2000 and June 2001,
sixty-nine of the one thousand pharmacies located in Kentucky and West

Virginia were robbed for OxyContin.128 Some pharmacies have
responded to the rising incidence of pharmacy robberies by refusing to
stock OxyContin. I29 The problem became so serious that Purdue Pharma,

in an effort to temper economic losses, announced early in 2003 that it
would replace all uninsured quantities of OxyContin stolen from

pharmacies after July 1, 2001.30 While the economic losses to
pharmacies are unfortunate, perhaps a farther-reaching effect of the

pharmacy robbery trend is the potential for a greater restriction of access
to a valuable pain medication.
higher dosages or showing withdrawal symptoms, are very similar to the drug-seeking
behavior of the addicted substance abuser. Id.
124 Cf id. at 58-59 (noting that case law fails to provide a comprehensive guide for
professional conduct and that many turn to model standards for guidance).
125 Id. (discussing four cases "instructive in an important way for those who must
establish decision-making rules for pharmacists in day-to-day practice," but noting that
case law alone is inadequate for that purpose).
126 See id.
127 See id. at 60.
12 8
DEA KENTUCKY FACTSHEET, supra note 4.
129 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 15 (discussing a pharmacy in Louisville, Kentucky,
that posted a conspicuous sign warning customers that they no longer stocked OxyContin
in response to an armed robbery for the drug); Mark Hamstra, Shaw's Removes
OxyContin from Pharmacy Shelves, SUPERMARKET NEWS, July 16, 2001, at 45
(discussing decisions by pharmacies in Massachusetts and Maine to stop carrying
OxyContin in response to store thefts, offering instead to order it for patients with
prescriptions); Stephanie Loughran, Stop & Shop Plays it Safe, Pulls OxyContin,
SUPERMARKET NEWS, May 6, 2002, at 125 (detailing the decision of New England's Stop
& Shop stores to stop selling OxyContin in all 226 of its pharmacies in response to a rash
of robberies for the drug).
130 Purdueto Replace Stolen OxyContin, DRUG Topics, Feb. 3, 2003, at 5.
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B. Kentucky Responses to PharmaceuticalAbuse and Diversion
Medical professionals and the state bodies responsible for their
oversight have become more sensitive to the needs of pain patients by
developing measures to counter prescription drug abuse. Some of these
measures are discussed below.
1. State Medical Board Guidelines
In response to the pain undertreatment problem, the Federation of
State Medical Boards ("FSMB") developed guidelines for proper
oversight of opioid use in pain management.1 31 These FSMB guidelines
provide definitions to aid physicians and pharmacists in the effective use
of pain medication so that concern for opioid diversion does not
undermine the proper treatment of pain.t 32 Further, the FSMB guidelines
provide pharmacists with a more workable legal standard to judge
whether a prescription is valid and therapeutically appropriate. The
guidelines help clarify the difference between the pseudo-addictive
behavior of a legitimate patient and the similar drug-seeking behavior of
an addict-the former is not a sound reason to conclude a prescription is
not therapeutically sound.'33 The FSMB guidelines are an important step
in providing clear rules for pharmacists that help guarantee proper patient
pain management while remaining mindful of the substance abuse issue.
The Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure ("KBML") developed its
own Guidelinesfor the Use of Controlled Substances in Pain Treatment,
which are largely based on those created by the FSMB, but with more
specific attention given to avoiding diversion.134 The KBML guidelines
represent a positive step in addressing opioid diversion while also
protecting pain management patients. 135

131 MODEL

GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR THE

TREATMENT OF PAIN (Federation of State Medical Boards 1998), http://www.medsch.
wisc.edu/ painpolicy/domestic/model.htm.
132 Brushwood, supranote 109, at 59.
133 See id. (noting that under the FSMB guidelines, physical dependence is not
equated with addiction, and "the volume and frequency of pain medication use are far
less relevant than is the quality of care being provided for the patient").
134 Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure, Guidelines for the Use of Controlled
Substances in Pain Treatment (adopted Mar. 22, 2001), available at http://www.state.
ky.us/agencies/kbml/painmanageguide.pdf (modified Sept. 18, 2003).

135 Pain & Policy Studies Group, University of Wisconsin Comprehensive Cancer

Center, 2001 Annual Review of State Pain Policies: A Question of Balance (2002),
http://www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy/publicat/0lannrev/ar-ky.htm.
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While generally considered an advancement for pain management,
the KBML guidelines have received some criticism. The University of
Wisconsin's Pain & Policy Studies Group ("UWPPSG") notes two
1 36
potential deficiencies in the language of the new KBML guidelines.
The first area of concern involves language that implies opioid treatment
is a last resort, appropriate only when nonaddictive measures are
exhausted. 137 Since treating pain with opioid medications is recognized
as the most effective treatment under some circumstances, reserving such
treatment as a last resort is troubling because it may prolong suffering."'
As a result, patients may suffer needlessly if doctors are required to try
potentially less effective treatments first. The implication arising from
this approach in the KBML guidelines is that easing patient suffering is
not the top priority.
The second area of concern is language in the guidelines suggesting
a hiatus from opioid treatment if the patient does not progress toward
treatment goals.1 39 The UWPPSG commentary explains that this practice

is no longer considered appropriate in pain management. 14 Aside from
these two areas of concern, the KBML guidelines represent a great step
toward addressing pharmaceutical diversion and abuse while still
protecting the patient in need.
There are indications that a physician's risk of prosecution correlates
to a small degree with the local prosecutor's perception of the medical
profession's ability to monitor its doctors.' 41 As a result, the KBML
guidelines help restore Kentucky prosecutors' faith in the state medical
board measures designed to reduce diversion and abuse of narcotic pain
medications. In turn, this may lead to more appropriate physician
conduct in prescribing opioid analgesics by reducing the fear of
prosecution42 that prompts many physicians to curb their prescription
practices.1
136 id.

Id. ("The 'Evaluation of the patient' section requires physicians to determine
'that non-addictive' treatments are ineffective or unacceptable prior to beginning
treatment with opioid analgesics. This is unique language and appears to imply that
opioids
138 are a last resort.").
id.
139 Id. ("The 'periodic review' section ... includ[es] references to previous board
policy that recommends the use of drug holidays.... The use of drug holidays is no
longer140considered to be appropriate pain management practice.").
id.
141 See Ziegler & Lovrich, supra note 21, at 78, 87-88.
142See supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text.
137
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In this manner, law enforcement policies may be more appropriately
balanced with policies that promote adequate pain management.
2. KASPER
In 1999, Kentucky established the Kentucky All Schedule
Prescription Electronic Reporting System ("KASPER"), 143 a prescription
monitoring system designed to help law enforcement officials identify
doctor-shoppers more quickly. 144 The system compiles information on
pharmacy sales of "every controlled substance sold in Kentucky's 2100
pharmacies," as well as "the prescription records of individual
patients."' 145 To assist in the compilation of the database, all pharmacists
and physicians
must report dispensation of controlled substances to
46
KASPER.
The information in KASPER is currently made available to several
different groups. Law enforcement officials may access the information
after certifying that "it is needed for a specific, criminal investigation.' ' 47
Additionally, pharmacists and physicians may access KASPER
information to assist in the treatment of specific patients.148
KASPER represents a promising step toward solving Kentucky's
prescription drug abuse problem. 4 9 However, its limited range creates a
major loophole for drug seekers; because only Kentucky pharmacies and
doctors are monitored, drug seekers can evade detection by crossing state
lines to obtain or fill prescriptions. 50 This loophole is of particular
concern in Eastern Kentucky because of the region's proximity to the
borders of four neighboring states.' 51 As proof of this problem and its
143 Gil, supra note 17.
." Id.; Gideon Gil, Improved Drug Monitoring Supported, Prescription Programs
May Help More to Fight Abuse, COURIER-JOURNAL, Aug. 26, 2003, at BI (noting that
KASPER serves as a national model for combating prescription drug abuse).
145 Gil, supra note 144.
16 Id. KASPER has been effective at collecting data on prescriptions: "information

on 35 million prescriptions filled at pharmacies in Kentucky since 1999" has been
compiled. Id.
147 Deborah Yetter, Computer Database Aided Drug Investigation, COURIERJOURNAL, Feb. 8, 2001, at A8.
148 Id.
149 See id.
150 Gil, supra note 17 ("Most of the seven states bordering Kentucky do not have
prescription-drug monitoring systems-so doctor-shoppers can avoid detection by
crossing state lines.").
151 Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia, and Tennessee all border the Eastern Kentucky
region, and neither Tennessee nor Virginia have computer systems to monitor the sale of
controlled substances. Id.
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scope, some physicians, after being convicted for illegally prescribing
controlled substances, reportedly instructed patients to fill their
152
prescriptions in nearby states in order to avoid KASPER's detection.
This loophole is being addressed by giving the Secretary of the
Cabinet for Health Services the authority to enter reciprocity agreements
with parallel agencies in other states so that data from drug monitoring
systems can be combined to inhibit doctor-shopping across state lines.153
Another adjustment to KASPER that should improve its effectiveness
allows "designated agents of the Cabinet for Health Services" to access
the information 154 in order to analyze data regarding trends in prescribing
practices and controlled substance usage. 5 5 This expanded access may
allow state agencies a greater opportunity to take action before
prescription drug abuse in a particular area reaches epidemic status.
When these measures were first under consideration, critics
complained of the potential for a chilling effect on physician prescribing
practices resulting from expansions in Kentucky's prescriptionmonitoring programs.1 56 Meanwhile, proponents of the measures noted
that thorough documentation on behalf of prescribing physicians would
physicians who prescribed controlled substances
adequately insulate
57
appropriately.1
From a pain management perspective, expansions to KASPER and
any broadening of investigatory action could potentially restrict patients'
access to opioid analgesics, largely because of physicians' and
pharmacists' misconceptions about the risk of discipline for prescribing
opioid analgesics.158 Were an expansion to KASPER to have this
unintended yet foreseeable effect, it would again illustrate law
enforcement policies overriding pain management policies.

152Id. One pharmacist in Virginia, a state with no prescription monitoring system,
admitted to filling over a hundred prescriptions for OxyContin in several hours-all
written by the same since-convicted Kentucky physician. Id.
153Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 218A.245 (Michie 2004).
154
Id. § 218A.240.
155

Id.

156 Damon Adams, Kentucky Doctors May Face More Scrutiny on Prescription

Habits, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, Oct. 20, 2003, at 10 (discussing expansions allowing
"the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure to extend investigations of a physician to
other doctors
in that physician's practice or community").
157 id.
15
See supra notes 85-127 and accompanying text.
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C. Uniform Reporting System Neededfor Drug-RelatedDeaths

The alarm connected with prescription drug abuse is based in part on
the number of fatalities linked to such abuse. However, the number of
deaths attributed to OxyContin or oxycodone overdose varies greatly
both -in Eastern Kentucky and nationally, depending on the source
consulted. One factor that could contribute to these inconsistent numbers
is the difficulty in classifying the cause of death when multiple
substances are taken contemporaneously. 159 This factor is not reflected in
unsystematized medical examiner or coroner cause-of-death ("COD")
reports and has been identified as a contributing factor to the difficulty of
accurately reporting drug-related deaths. 60 The executive director of
Kentucky's Medical Examiner's Office acknowledged the disparity in
the published numbers of deaths caused by OxyContin. In fact, the
executive director attributes only two Kentucky deaths to oxycodone
alone over a twelve-month period.'16 State and federal agencies need
consistent information from the sources they refer to in developing new
policies. State medical examiners' and coroners' reports are such
sources, and their reporting practices may have a great impact on policy
development.
Methods employed by state medical examiners and coroners for
reporting drug overdose deaths can simplify the complexity of
ascertaining whether controlled substance interaction causes death. 162 A
lack of accuracy in such reporting can contribute to misconceptions
about a drug's safety or patterns of abusers' behaviors. To illustrate, a
data base including 1243 fatal overdose cases was created from data
collected by twenty-three states' medical examiner and coroner offices
between August 1999 and January 2002. This database consisted only of
cases in which oxycodone was identified as a contributing factor. 163 Of
1014 applicable cases, 164 90.6% involved drug abuse, and 96.7% of those
159See generally Cone et al., supra note 53 (concluding that accurate studies of
mortality rates attributable to abuse of narcotic drugs would benefit from standardized
methods of classifying and reporting causes of death).
160 Id. at 58-59.
161Kaushik, supra note 55, at 16-17 (quoting the executive director of Kentucky's
medical examiner's office as saying, "as far as deaths go, I've heard different numbers in
different places at different times; I have no idea where these people are getting their

facts-and-figures").

162Cone et al., supranote 53, at 58-59.
163

Id. at 57.

164Id. (229 cases were excluded from this study either because they were incomplete
or they were submitted without any identified oxycodone involvement).
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deaths involved abuse of at least one other drug in addition to
oxycodone.65 Only 3.3% of the compiled cases reported oxycodone as
the sole chemical identified. 66 Less than half of the deaths involving
only oxycodone were identified as deaths caused by OxyContinamounting to 1.3% of all drug abuse deaths in the database. 167 Analysis
of the database revealed that there is under appreciation among drug
abusers of the increased risk of death when opiods and
other central
168
nervous system depressants are used contemporaneously.
The following passage best explains why some reports do not present
data on cause of death with optimal accuracy in drug-related cases:
Medical Examiners and Coroners (ME/C) frequently rely on toxicology
analysis with a focus on drug concentration in the biological fluids as a
key determinant of the cause of death. Such practices ignore the
contribution of other drugs present at lower concentrations,
pharmacological issues such as toxic drug-drug interactions,
antemortem development of tolerance to the respiratory depression
169
effects of opiods, and postmortem drug redistribution ....

"[F]atalities attributed to overdose are likely to have opioid
concentrations no higher than those found in regular opioid abusers,
abusers who died from other causes, or patients who have been
compliant with therapy and died from other causes. ' ' 7o Threfore, it is
possible for reports of deaths resulting from more complex drug
interactions (i.e. contemporaneous abuse of multiple controlled
substances) to identify oxycodone as the primary contributing factor
despite the presence of smaller amounts of other contributing substances.
Data regarding contributing factors and causes of drug abuse deaths
influences law enforcement policies and public health policies.
Therefore, a classification system that gives due consideration to the
significant role that the contemporaneous abuse of multiple drugs may
play in the cause of death is an important step toward adequately
165 Id. at 64 ("There were an average of 3.5 additional drugs that plausibly
contributed to the fatal outcome.").
166 Id. at 57 ("The most prevalent drug combinations were oxycodone in
combination with benzodiazepines, alcohol, cocaine, other narcotics, marijuana, or
antidepressants.").
167 Id. (noting that only twelve of the thirty total oxycodone-only deaths reported
OxyContin as the source of the oxycodone).
161 Id. at 58.
169Id. at 58-59.
170
Id. at 59.
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protecting the interests of all groups involved.'17 Pharmaceutical
manufacturers would benefit from such a system because they are
harmed when imprecise reporting leads to misplaced public
72 perceptions
regarding the role their products play in drug abuse deaths.
. Furthermore, media reports relying on imprecise reporting
techniques not only affect the public, they have an undeniable influence
on the perceptions of lawmakers, judges, and juries as well. This could
lead to legal theories, prosecutions, or verdicts unfavorable to
pharmaceutical manufacturers that fail to serve best the needs of society.
Pharmaceutical products that fill an unmet need in the pain management
field may be unavailable as a result. Further, a legal climate perceived as
hostile to opioid medications could deter the research and development
of pain management therapies.
If state bodies are to ensure policies and practices that protect the
interests of those who rightfully benefit from opioid analgesics, it is vital
to have uniform, systematized, and accurate reporting of mortality data in
drug overdose deaths. 17 3 Otherwise, valuable products like OxyContin
could suffer from undue vilification and management of chronic pain
could become even more challenged.
V. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF INTERNET PHARMACIES

Internet pharmacies 7 4 warrant special concern in addressing
prescription drug diversion because traditional regulatory mechanisms
are not equipped to monitor this recent technology. As unscrupulous
physicians and pharmacies are identified and disciplined and supplies of
opioid analgesics in Eastern Kentucky diminish, many doctor-shoppers
will likely utilize the Internet as a new source for controlled substances.
The following section discusses the regulatory issues surrounding
Internet pharmacies.

171

See id. at 65. The Drug Abuse Warning Network ("DAWN"), currently the most

standardized mortality data reporting system in the U.S., was developed by the DEA in
the early 19 70's. Id. DAWN was the system used in the study referenced supra in notes

139-44 and accompanying text.
172 See id.
173See Cone et al., supra note 53, at 65 ("These data have [a] major impact on
public health policies, law enforcement, and pharmaceutical firms whose therapeutic
products are misused or abused.").
174 "Internet pharmacy" refers to any entity that "sells medications through its web
site." Kerry Toth Rost, Note, Policing the "Wild West" of Internet Pharmacies, 76 CHIKENT L. REv. 1333, 1333 (2000). These internet pharmacies may be legitimate and lawabiding, or may facilitate acquisition of drugs without a prescription. See id.
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A. InternetPharmaciesGenerally

The problems inherent in trying to regulate Internet pharmacies have
not yet been fully addressed. Because Internet pharmacies are difficult to
monitor, the danger exists that doctor-shoppers will turn to them for
drugs. If efforts to curb diversion are successful, the availability of
opioid analgesics will decrease, thus potentially making this danger a
reality.
175
Internet pharmacies are beneficial because of their convenience,
the opportunity to obtain lower-cost pharmaceuticals,' 7 6 the facilitation
of patients' privacy, 177 and, in some cases, their ability to help "improve

patient compliance with drug therapies.'

78

Despite their benefits when

used responsibly, Internet pharmacies contribute significantly to the
problem of opioid analgesic diversion and abuse. 179 Due in part to their

ability to close and reopen within hours, the exact number of Internet
pharmacies is unknown.'8t

Only some types of Internet pharmacies,

including those that provide "cyber consultations," or those that require
no prescription at all, contribute to the drug diversion and abuse

problem.' 8 ' In addition, "many online questionnaires have the answers
175See id. at 1337 (emphasizing a convenience benefit for pharmacy customers who
may have decreased mobility or live far from a pharmacy); see also Richard C. Ausness,
Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to GreaterTort Liabilityfor Prescription
Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 136 (2002) (noting that Internet
pharmacies offer "better access to prescription drugs for the elderly and those who live in
rural areas").
176 Rost, supra note 174, at 1337 (noting that the ability to offer drugs at lower cost
may be related to lower fixed costs and increased competition).
177 Id. (noting that internet pharmacies allow patients to avoid the embarrassment of
picking up condition-revealing medications in person and to ask questions out of the
presence of others if the pharmacy provides access to a pharmacist).
178 Id. at 1338 (noting that some internet pharmacies send e-mail notifications to
customers to remind them when refills are required).
179 See Marks, supra note 1.
180 Id. An exact figure on the number of internet pharmacies is also difficult to
obtain because of the rapid growth of this particular market segment: the American
Medical Association reported an increase in the number of internet pharmacies from
thirty to over 400 between January 1999 and July 1999. Rost, supra note 174, at 1334.
181 Rost, supra note 174, at 1334-39 ("Essentially, three types of Internet
pharmacies exist: (1) pharmacies that only fill prescriptions written by a patient's
physician; (2) pharmacies that charge the patient for a physician 'cyber-consultation'
(which usually consists of ... a simple questionnaire) ... ; (3) pharmacies that dispense
prescription drugs without a physician's prescription."). Internet pharmacies pose an
additional risk because they allow a patient to self-diagnose and thus bypass important
safeguards in the prescription drug distribution procedure. Id.
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preselected for the patient," thus facilitating "the patient providing false
or incorrect information" in order to obtain a prescription. 182
B. Operatingin the Interstices ofEstablishedRegulatory Mechanisms
183
Internet pharmacies present a host of regulatory and legal issues.

According to the FDA, foreign Internet pharmacies pose an additional
84
problem because they are outside the jurisdiction of the United States.'
Further complicating the issue is that within the United States no single
agency is responsible for the regulation of Internet pharmacies. The
effectiveness of the 18current
approach, employing both state and federal
5
power, is debatable.

The issue of who can and should regulate Internet pharmacies is
complex. "The FDA purports to lack both the resources and staff needed

to deal with the issues raised by Internet pharmacies and online
prescribing."

86

Further, FDA prefers to place heightened regulatory

responsibility on companies selling drugs, other regulatory bodies, and
state regulatory boards. 187 The DEA also claims to lack the proper

resources, and its limited number of pharmaceutical diversion agents lack
arrest authority; these agents must therefore rely on other DEA

departments to make arrests.188 Further highlighting the lack of clear
regulatory authority, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") can take
civil action against Internet pharmacies' fraudulent commercial practices,
but cannot file criminal complaints. 89
"' id. at 1341.
183Id. at 1338-44. Because physician regulation is state-based, Internet pharmacies'
use of doctors from other states makes reprimand difficult. Also, choice-of-law problems
are heightened when the state of purchase, the state of a physician's licensing, and the state
of the pharmacy's operations are all different. Id. at 1342-43.
184 Kristin Yoo, Self-PrescribingMedication: Regulating PrescriptionDrug Sales
on the Internet, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 57, 58-59 (2001) (noting that
counterfeit medications, medications below United States manufacturing practice standards,
and the sale of non-FDA approved products are risks that accompany foreign Internet
pharmacies). See also Rost, supra note 174, at 1345; Fake OxyContin Seized, CHAIN
DRUG REVIEW, Jan. 20, 2003, at 11 (detailing the seizure of thousands of counterfeit
OxyContin pills at New York and Boston international airports).
185See Rost, supra note 174, at 1343-45.
6
" Id. at 1345.
187 Id. at 1344-45.
188 Marks, supra note I (stating that only 400 of the DEA's 4000 drug agents track
pharmaceutical diversion and that their efforts focus mostly on the most deviant doctors
and pharmacies).
1 9
. (noting that the FTC files civil suits, but not criminal complaints). The FTC may
take action if a website makes false or misleading claims about drug safety or efficacy, or if
an Internet pharmacy states falsely its privacy practices. Rost, supra note 174, at 1348.
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There exists a debate about whether the regulation of Internet
pharmacies should be shouldered by the states or by the federal
government. "[Ciritics of federal involvement argue that there currently
is no need for federal regulation of Internet pharmacies because
individual states are regulating the industry and... [they] fear that such
involvement would lead to federal regulation of the practice of
medicine."' 190 It is possible that excessive regulation of Internet
pharmacies could eclipse the benefits to patients that Internet technology
provides, and it could become another example of law enforcement
policies preempting public health policies. While the American Medical
Association, the Federation of Sate Medical. Boards, and the National
Association of Pharmacy Boards recognize the problem with Internet
pharmacies, they prefer a regulatory scheme that does not nullify the
potential for Internet technology to provide public health benefits.1 9'
While federal regulation of Internet pharmacies raises concerns,
there is a problem with the alternative: state-based regulatory bodies
92
encounter many difficulties in efforts to regulate Internet pharmacies.'
C. CurrentLaw and Internet Pharmacies
Current law does little to address the burgeoning problem of illegal
Internet opioid analgesic sales. The Controlled Substances Act ("CSA")
has the same requirements for drug distribution regardless of whether it
is Internet based or goes through more traditional channels. 193 The
Internet Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act ("IPCPA") attempted to
amend the FFDCA by requiring Internet pharmacies to post certain
information on their websites, but failed to pass the House. 9 4 While the
IPCPA would have been a positive step in the regulation of Internet
Pharmacies, website operators often do not register their sites and would
therefore have been difficult to prosecute for violation of the IPCPA.' 95
The problems that stem from monitoring pharmacists and physicians
that operate out of physical offices are multiplied when these
190 Rost, supra note 174, at 1353.
191See id. at 1346-48.
92See supra note 183.
193Yoo, supra note 184, at 83.
'94H.R. 2763, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring the name, address, and telephone
number of the business; name of licensed physicians and pharmacists, as well as states in
which they are licensed to practice; and links to this licensing information on each page
of the website).
195
Yoo, supra note 184, at 80-81.
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practitioners utilize the Internet instead. 196 Typically, the contribution an
unscrupulous physician or pharmacist can make to illicit opioid analgesic
distribution is limited by the number of patients who can travel to-their
offices for prescriptions and medications. Internet pharmacies are not
bound by such geographical limitations. Just one unscrupulous Internet
pharmacy site can provide controlled substances to any drug-seeker,
anywhere. Further, since there is no established national prescription
monitoring system, drug-seekers are not restricted to using only one
Internet pharmacy. The impact these operations have on the black market
can only be estimated, and there is no reason this profitable business
should not continue growing until a regulatory mechanism proves
effective in punishing physicians and pharmacists who work with
noncompliant Internet pharmacies.
The complexity of Internet technology makes the onus of addressing
Internet pharmaceutical regulation and diversion that much more
difficult. Because their products are accessible to all with Internet access,
the public health risk posed by Internet pharmacies can be considerable.
These characteristics indicate a need for responsive policies selected for
their administrative efficiency and justified by the great risk to public
health. There is a risk that such policies will have little regard for the
benefits Internet pharmacies create for patients, especially those whose
movement is restricted by intractable pain. Some response is necessary.
However, the best response is one that is sensitive to patients' needs,
while still limiting access to irresponsible abusers.
V.

PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURING AND TORT LAW

The regulatory responses to pharmaceutical drug abuse addressed
above illustrate the confluence of two distinct concerns: concerns for the
deleterious societal effects of drug abuse and concerns for the needs of
patients in pain. This same interplay is manifested in the policies behind
tort law. Purdue Pharma has been accused of violating various consumer
protection and antitrust laws for its conduct in developing and marketing
OxyContin. 97 Some complaints filed against Purdue Pharma include
proposed changes to existing tort doctrines.' 98 Some of these proposed
changes are in response to shifts in medical practices that could have an
impact on the research and production of opioid analgesics. Purdue
196See generally id. at 57-61 (discussing the current difficulties in regulation of

internet pharmacies).

197Ausness, supra note 175, at 133-35.
198 Id. (discussing the potential applicability to prescription drug sales of negligent

marketing claims for overpromotion or negligent failure to supervise retail sellers).
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Pharma's production and distribution of OxyContin illustrates well how
this could occur. The following section analyzes three tort doctrines that
affect opioid analgesic manufacturers and discusses the likely effects on
developing tort law when concerns for drug abuse take precedence over
concerns for the needs of patients in pain.
A.

The Learned IntermediaryRule

In general, "products liability law" imposes a duty "to warn the
ultimate consumer" of any dangers associated with a product. 199
However, in the case of pharmaceutical manufacturers, this basic duty is
supplanted by the learned intermediary rule, under which pharmaceutical
manufacturers only have a duty to adequately warn prescribing
physicians and pharmacists. 00 This rule is premised on the traditional
notion of the physician-patient relationship: "the physician is primarily
responsible for deciding what drugs to prescribe, while the patient plays
a relatively passive role."20' There are exceptions to this rule, such as
choices concerning methods of birth control, where the physician is not
central to the decision-making process.20 2
Traditionally, pharmaceutical companies limited their marketing
only to physicians. This fact helps explain the different treatment
pharmaceutical manufacturers receive, as evidenced by the learned
intermediary rule.20 3 This approach to liability is changing, and multiple
forms of negligent marketing liability have been proposed in response to
shifts in pharmaceutical firms' marketing practices-especially the
advent of direct-to-consumer advertising.2

As the traditional physician-patient relationship has given way to
increased patient input in deciding which drugs the doctor will prescribe,
and pharmaceutical companies have begun marketing their products
directly to consumers, some note that the justifications for the learned
intermediary rule are becoming weaker. 205 For example, the Restatement
9 Id.
200 Id.

at 107.
at 106-07.
201 Id. at 108. The idea is that the physician is the decision maker, so warning the
patient is unnecessary. Id.
202 Id. at 110-13 (discussing exceptions for vaccinations, oral contraceptives, and
devices).
intrauterine
203
Id. at 97-98.
2o4Id. at 98-99.
205 Id. at 113-14. The erosion of the traditional physician-patient relationship is
especially prominent inthe realm of Internet pharmaceutical sales. See supra Part IV.
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(Third) of Torts: Products Liability stipulates that manufacturers of

prescription drugs should warn patients directly if "the manufacturer
knows or has reason to know that health-care providers will not be in a
position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or
warnings. ,,206 The comments to the Restatement leave to the courts
whether an exception to the learned intermediary rule will be allowed. 0 7
If the learned intermediary rule were abolished altogether, manufacturers
would be 208required to create warnings for both physicians and
consumers.
In the case of OxyContin, imposing a requirement on Purdue Pharma
to warn both physicians and consumers would likely be nothing but a
hollow formality. All opioid analgesic packages warn of potential risks
associated with the drug.2 9 If abolishing the learned intermediary rule is
premised on providing the user with more information, these warnings
are already sufficient. More detailed warnings regarding the heightened
risks when the pill is crushed, snorted, or injected would likely advance
safety objectives little; worse yet, it could actually serve as a suggestion
for more effective abuse instead of as a deterrent.
Another problem with abolishing the learned intermediary rule is that
doing so would weaken the traditional physician-patient relationship. As
noted, the learned intermediary rule took root when physicians, rather
than patients, made all treatment decisions. 210 The traditional exceptions
to the learned intermediary rule involve drugs and devices that are
administered to large segments of the population to address conditions
less individualized than the treatment of chronic pain.2 ' Unlike the
traditional situation, the prescription of opioid analgesics retains a strong
need for physician oversight and involvement. As such, the learned
intermediary rule maintains an appropriate balance for use in the context
of opioid analgesics.
Rather than widening the gap between physicians and patients,
general practitioners and pain specialists alike should focus on increased

206RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1998).
207 Ausness, supra note 175, at 117 (noting that the court in Perez v. Wyeth

Laboratories Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999), recognized an exception for direct-toconsumer advertising).
2
at 136.
2"Id.
09See id. at 99-100.
2 10
See id. at 110.
211 Id. at 110-13 (noting recognized exceptions to the learned intermediary rule for
vaccine programs, oral contraceptives, and intrauterine devices).
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physician-patient communication for treating chronic pain.
When
viewed from this perspective, abolishing the learned intermediary rule
would: do little to advance the objectives of those who support its
abolition.
B. Negligent Marketing

Negligent marketing is a tort theory "based on the notion that
manufacturers should be required to market their products in a way that
or others., 213

minimizes the risk that consumers will injure themselves
There are two recognized types of negligent marketing: 1) marketing
toward unsuitable consumers; 2 14 and 2) failure to supervise retail
sellers.21 5 A third proposed strain of negligent marketing is
overpromotion, 216 which "involves the efforts of manufacturers to
pressure or bribe doctors to prescribe certain prescription drugs ...in
excessive dosages or to persons who do not really need them., 21 7 The
latter two types of negligent marketing are potentially of great
consequence to pharmaceutical manufacturers and thus to pain therapy

patients. 2 8 Again, the production and promotion of OxyContin serves to
illustrate the likely result of these proposals.
Purdue Pharma has been accused of negligent failure to supervise
retail sellers for supplying OxyContin to foreign and internet pharmacies
with an awareness that people could obtain it without a valid
212 Itis arguable, at least in instances where harm has resulted from a patient's use of
OxyContin or other opioid analgesics, that a lack of ongoing physician-patient
communication actually contributed to the improper use of the medication.
213Ausness, supra note 175, at 123 (noting that most negligent marketing cases to date
have involved handgun manufacturers). See also Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liabilityfor the
Sale of Non-Defective Products:An Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent
Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 908-09 (2002) ("This theory assumes that ...
manufacturers ... have a duty to market their products in a manner that will not
affirmatively increase a product's inherent risk to consumers and third parties").
214Ausness, supra note 175, at 123-24. This form "focuses on advertising or
promotional efforts that are intended to induce unsuitable persons to purchase products that
are dangerous to themselves or others." Id.
211 Id. at 124-25. This form "subject[s] manufacturers to liability when they distribute
their products in a way that enables unauthorized users to obtain access to them from
unscrupulous retail sellers." Id.
216 Id. at 125.
217 Id. at 133.
218 See id. The first type of negligent marketing, marketing toward unsuitable
customers, "does not seem relevant to the promotion and sale of prescription drugs." Id.
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prescription.2 9 Overpromotion is also potentially applicable to Purdue
Pharma's marketing of OxyContin, based on fringe benefits purportedly
220
offered to prescribing doctors and indirect off-label marketing.
Negligent marketing is described as a "bonanza for plaintiffs and a
nightmare for defendants" for several reasons: a) plaintiff's success does
not depend upon proving a product is defective; b) the learned
intermediary rule cannot be invoked to defend a claim of negligent
marketing; c) the standard for liability is "essentially meaningless" due to
the absence of an "objective way to determine when a particular
marketing practice is appropriate and when it can be characterized as
negligent"; and d) juries will ultimately decide cases because the claims
are highly fact specific. 221
Manufacturer liability for negligent marketing also presupposes that
there is no need for dissemination of information regarding new and
effective pain management resources like OxyContin. It is thus possible
to view Purdue Pharma's purported aggressive marketing of OxyContin
as a reasonable and justified approach to increasing physician familiarity
with an opioid analgesic that represents a breakthrough in pain
management technology. This point of view is supported by the
recognition of the widespread undertreatment of pain.222
Imposing additional duties on pharmaceutical manufacturers through
the abolition of the learned intermediary rule or the ascendancy of
negligent marketing doctrines will likely have a negative financial
impact on prescription drug companies. 223 One foreseeable result is
higher liability costs, which will decrease the availability of opioid
analgesics and increase their cost. 224 In light of the widespread
undertreatment of pain, this reduction in pharmaceutical availability
would primarily harm patients in need. The rapid increase in the number
of OxyContin prescriptions following its introduction suggests that pain
patients had found an effective treatment for chronic pain.225 Increased
2 19

Id. at 135-36.

220 Id. at 133-35 (listing free plane tickets, hotel accommodations, and seminars

Pharma).
among
2 1 fringe benefits offered by Purdue
d. at 138.
222

pain).
223

See supra notes 85-127 and accompanying text (discussing the undertreatment of
Ausness, supra note 175. The situation faced by pharmaceutical manufacturers is

even more serious because many courts have relieved plaintiffs of the burden to prove
cause-in-fact, enabling plaintiffs to overcome otherwise serious problems of causation
through the substantial factor test or market share liability. In addition, due to the threat
of great expense, class action suits can coerce settlement even when claims are

Id.
groundless.
224
225

1d. at 139.
See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
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liability for zealous promotion of a beneficial drug potentially harms the
two parties most essential to the transaction: the producers and the

intended consumers.
C. Off-Label Use and Marketing
1. What the FDA Allows
The FDA requires that drug labels include all approved uses,

"warnings, precautions, clinical pharmacology, indications, contraindications, and adverse reactions. '2 6 Consequently, any method or
manner of use other than that for which a pharmaceutical was approved
by the FDA is considered an "off-label use." 227 "If a manufacturer

wishes an off-label use to be added to a drug's labeling. It must apply to
the FDA for approval as it would for a new drug. 2 28 This can be an
expensive and exhaustive process.2 29 Similarly, "off-label prescribing" is

simply prescribing medication for an off-label use; this practice is
outside the scope of the FDA's regulatory authority. 230 Likewise, "off-

label marketing" is also an issue. It occurs "when the manufacturers of
the drugs promote or advertise their products for purposes, to users, in
dosages, or in combinations other than the FDA-approved ones. 231 The

FDA attempts to strictly control off-label marketing, but it should be
noted that this regulation applies only to manufacturers:

226 Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription,and Marketingof FDA-Approved
Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REv. 181, 187
(1999) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a) (1998) and 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(d) (1998)).
227 See id. at 187-88 ("The most typical off-label uses are use by persons other than
those for whom the drug was approved, use in dosages other than the approved dosages,
use for conditions other than those indicated in the labeling, and use in unapproved
combination with other drugs.").
228 Id. (noting the lack of incentive for drug manufacturers to obtain FDA approval
for off-label uses since it is difficult and does not necessarily increase sales, "especially
if off-label applications are already well known and off-label use is already
widespread").
221 See id. at 188 (characterizing the FDA approval process as "tedious
and
expensive").
230
See id. at 189 190.
231 Id. at 191; see also Ausness, supra note 175, at 134. The economic incentives
to
engage in off-label marketing are clear: more advertised uses means more users, and
more users means more sales.
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Accordingly, when physicians write freely about off-label applications
of prescription drugs, they are not engaging in off-label marketing, and
their activities have never been proscribed. Conversely, if the
manufacturer of these drugs reproduces or distributes the doctor's
writings to other physicians, its activities are considered to fall in what
historically2 32has been the highly-controlled arena of off-label
marketing.

The two ends of the spectrum, defined by who is disseminating the
information regarding an off-label use, are fairly clear. However, a
common practice that is more questionable involves manufacturers
providing "grants supporting symposia on unapproved uses of drugs, or
to encourage their off-label use or
grants to managed-care organizations
233
promotion of a product.,
It is estimated "that between twenty and sixty percent of all
prescriptions are for off-label uses,, 23 4 and some assert that optimal
patient care requires such off-label uses. 235 Under this view, FDA
monitoring of these uses unnecessarily pulls resources away from the
FDA's primary purpose of efficiently assessing new drugs and constrains
effective practitioner discretion. 236 Indeed, the General Accounting
Office surmises that the FDA would be unable to review and approve
at the rate practitioners in
drugs under their meticulous approval process
2 37
the field discover effective off-label uses.
2. Benefits of BroadeningOff-Label Marketing Allowances
2 38
High quality scientific research is conducted in various settings.
Further, the FDA's monolithic role as holder of the sole approving power
should not be interpreted as diminishing the validity of findings of the
general scientific community.239 Some believe that, but for FDA
restrictions on off-label promotion, scientifically validated information
regarding new and beneficial off-label uses would be more widely
240
shared throughout the community-often for the benefit of the patient.
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Salbu, supra note 226, at 191.

233 Id. at 191-92.
34
2 Id. at 193.

Id. at 193-95.
Id. at 195-96.
237 Id. at 198.
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236
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id.

239 See id.
240

Id. at 198-99.
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"Liberalized off-label promotion therefore should yield the most
,,241
progressive medical practice.
Opponents of off-label use believe the heightened risk to public
health justifies regulatory control2 42 and argue that, without such
restrictions, patients become test subjects for off-label uses. 243 Yet, while
off-label use is a common practice in modem medicine, off-label
marketing is not.244 The distinction is justified by concern that lifting the
prohibition on off-label marketing would provide manufacturers with a
means of circumventing current regulatory measures by obtaining FDA
approval for the narrowest use, then immediately marketing the drug as
one with multifarious applications. 24 5 The risks of off-label marketing
are amplified by the conflicting interests of manufacturers seeking
profits, doctors who may be receiving gifts from pharmaceutical firms,
and scientists who may have undisclosed financial ties to pharmaceutical
firms. 246 Federal

legislation, passed

in

1997,247

allows off-label

promotion and marketing with restrictive conditions. 248 Passage of this
legislation was a small victory for proponents of off-label promotion.
However, the legislation is largely hampered by many hurdles that
frustrate the potential benefits of off-label promotion. 49

242

Id. at 199.
Id. at 201-02.

243

Id. at 204. A combination of two drugs, each individually approved by the FDA

241

but whose interaction had not been tested or approved, could be no safer than an entirely
unapproved compound. The fen-phen crisis shows the potential for a public health
tragedy as a result of off label use in just this way: two FDA approved drugs became
widely prescribed in an unapproved combination that was supported by published
scientific evidence. As a result, an estimated 285,000 users suffered heart valve damage.
Id. at 202-03.
244 See id. at 205.
245

Id. at 205-06.

246

See id. at 206-10.
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, 11 Stat. 2296

247

(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1997)).
248 See Salbu, supra note 226, at 211-12. Manufacturers may only disseminate
authorized information on off-label uses: "unabridged peer-reviewed articles or qualified
reference publications." Id. at 213 (footnotes omitted). Manufacturers must also submit a
copy of the information to the Secretary of Health and Human Services sixty days prior
to its intended dissemination. Id. at 214. Further, any transmission of this information
must be accompanied by a disclosure highlighting the lack of FDA approval for the offlabel use in question. Id. at 215-16. Finally, the legislation also provides a mechanism to
discontinue dissemination if problems arise. Id. at 216-17.
149 Id.at 217.
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3. The Effect ofHeightenedLiabilityfor Off-Label Uses on Opioid
Analgesic Manufacturers
Imposing heightened liability on Purdue Pharma and other
manufacturers of similar opioid analgesics for sponsoring seminars that
promote knowledge of a drug's effectiveness, when such education
would benefit current pain management, interferes with the established
information-sharing tradition of off-label uses. Effective off-label
applications may come to light in a variety of scientifically valid tests
and through physician experience.250 Since obtaining FDA approval for a
single medical application is exorbitantly expensive, limiting the means
by which off-label uses can be shared could increase a manufacturer's
costs to a prohibitive level. Some manufacturer practices are rightfully
prohibited. However, consideration should be given to the available
resources when a certain field of practice, pain management in this case,
suffers from a lack of attention. Allowing manufacturers to sponsor
seminars in such cases could help those who are active and
knowledgeable in a particular field enlighten those who are not.
The autonomy of physicians who participate in these seminars, as
well as physicians who ultimately prescribe medications and oversee
patients, demands consideration. Although it is undeniable that medical
technology necessitates some degree of regulatory paternalism, where
esoteric physician knowledge cannot be grasped by the average patient,
overly paternalistic policies can lead to restriction without benefit.
Unduly restrictive limits on a manufacturer's promotion of appropriate
off-label uses exemplifies just such an overly paternalistic policy.
D. ProposedLiability Theories Would Likely Harm Pain Patients'
Interests
It would be naive to assume that a pharmaceutical firm's marketing
decisions are motivated primarily by an altruistic desire to help the
suffering patient rather than to protect the firm's profit margin.
Protecting patients from harm that could result from these marketing
decisions is a strong factor favoring the existing safeguards that protect
patients. Even with these safeguards in place, the supply-and-demand
rubric ensures that, where there is a demand, even unprotected interests
will be served by those who seek a profit. The pain management field
exemplifies this principle: Purdue Pharma recognized the inadequacy of

250

See supra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
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current pain management technology and developed a product that
offered benefits competing drugs did not.
Increased dissemination of information about improvements in pain
management is imperative to correcting the pervasive undertreatment of
pain. Though some risks to patients may accompany such decisions, the
physician's role in prescribing controlled substances and participating in
seminars is essential to help avoid diversion and abuse and to protect
patients from harm. Physicians cannot make these decisions without
adequate information about available treatment.
Negative publicity and threats of liability have forced Purdue Pharma
to consider producing a chemical reformulation of OxyContin that could
reduce abuse by rendering ineffective all known methods of time-release
bypass. 25' While a reformulation could address the drug abuse problem,
it also might increase the chances of discovering new adverse reactions
252
From the patient's perspective, such a new form
in some patients.
would not represent an improvement to them; the value of the extended
release feature is so substantial relative to other pain treatments that it
justifies continued marketing despite emerging patterns of diversion.
Should a risk of harm to abusers warrant heightened liability for a
manufacturer whose conduct meets the needs of the suffering patient?
VI. CONCLUSION

Addressing Eastern Kentucky's prescription drug problem is
unquestionably a serious issue that has garnered significant attention. Its
prevalence demands a coordinated effort by law enforcement, healthcare
professionals, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and all others who control
the development of policy. Yet, the consequences can be grave for
patients with pain management needs when their access to effective
opioid analgesics is restricted or eliminated completely as a result of
antidiversion and antiabuse measures. Reducing the benefits of opioid
therapy to those patients for whom such technology was initially created
is an unsound approach to guarding against the conduct of irresponsible
third parties for whom these technologies were never intended.
The FDA drug approval process plays a crucial role in the
accessibility of opioid analgesics to legitimate patients. By placing a
251

See Noah, supra note 19, at 62 (describing investigation by Purdue Pharma of the

possibility of including naltrexone in OxyContin to stop those attempting to abuse the

drug).

252 See id.
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higher emphasis on the value of palliative care when balancing a drug's
benefits with its risks, and by focusing more on the intended recipients
than on unintended third parties, patient interests may be better protected.
An FDA approval policy that recognizes the value of more diverse
options for the treatment of chronic pain, rather than the current "one
size fits all" approach, would also benefit pain management."' Likewise,
the DEA plays a crucial role in protecting patient interests. By adopting
greater deference to medical practice on the state and federal level, the
DEA's role as enforcer of drug laws would be less likely to interfere with
those bodies whose objectives are separate from law enforcement.
Clearly communicating standards of permissible conduct to participants
in the pharmaceutical distribution chain would advance these goals.
On the state level, Kentucky's medical and pharmacy boards,
through education and policy changes, could help ensure that medical
professionals understand appropriate prescribing and prescription-filling
practices. Such education could encourage the confident treatment of
patients with pain management needs without the misconceived fear of
discipline. The KBML guidelines represent a valuable step toward this
objective. In time, regulatory oversight conducted in accordance with
these guidelines should enable health care professionals to more
confidently provide pain treatments with less concern for discipline. An
emphasis on close physician-patient communication would also ensure
that physicians become aware of suspicious or dangerous patient conduct
while at the same time furthering legitimate treatment goals.
Similarly, programs like KASPER, involving coordinated efforts
between state law enforcement officers and medical professionals, help
address Kentucky's prescription drug abuse and diversion problem.
The problem of internet pharmacies, however, requires a different
approach. Specialized regulation of internet pharmacies will most likely
occur at the federal level due to the necessity of uniform requirements; it
is not clear what steps Kentucky could feasibly take to address this issue.
Regardless of who eventually takes on this task, internet pharmacies
must become regulated because they will likely help expand the
diversion and abuse of opioid analgesics, even as law enforcement makes
great strides to reduce other avenues of diversion.
Proposed tort theories pose another potential complication to
effective pain management. Implementation of these theories could
affect the development of new pain management technologies if
manufacturers are subjected to heightened liability. The potential for
profits may be outweighed by the risk of liability and could result in a
253See

supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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decrease in the number of producers of opioid analgesics. Purdue
Pharma's experience with OxyContin illustrates the degree to which
developing and marketing new pain treatment drugs may make a
company a target for lawsuits, even though the drug represents a positive
breakthrough in pain management technology.
With regard to opioid analgesics, the proposed abolition of the
learned intermediary rule is undesirable because it would facilitate less
physician-patient involvement where more is needed, especially in
reducing diversion and abuse. Likewise, negligent marketing theories
have the potential to harm pain patients' interests. As off-label uses
become accepted after a drug's approval, the manufacturer is in a
position and has the financial incentive to ensure this potentially valuable
information is shared with prescribing physicians. Such marketing
practices do not compromise the integrity of medical practice because
they do not preempt the physician's role in overseeing a patient's
treatment. In the final analysis, malpractice liability can and does provide
an avenue for redress when physician conduct is egregious and warrants
patient recovery for harm. Most importantly, medical malpractice
provides an avenue for that redress without harming producers of pain
medicines.
In sum, countering opioid analgesic diversion and abuse requires the
coordinated effort of various state and federal regulatory, judicial, or law
enforcement bodies. These bodies operate on different policies, each
valuing medical health concerns to varying degrees. Because opioid
analgesics provide pain treatment for suffering patients, often when no
other treatment provides relief, legal and regulatory efforts to curb
diversion and abuse of these medications must place an emphasis on
preserving patient access to needed medications, promoting positive
developments in the pain management field, and minimizing any chilling
effect that threatened liability might have on practitioners and
pharmaceutical manufacturers for reasonable conduct that counters pain
undertreatment. Any response to opioid diversion and abuse that restricts
patient access to needed medications or dissuades manufacturers from
developing newer, more effective pain management technologies would
inappropriately contribute to pain undertreatment.

